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MEAN MUGGIN’ NO MORE: DETROIT FREE 
PRESS v. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE AND A 
NON-TRIVIAL PRIVACY INTEREST IN 
BOOKING PHOTOGRAPHS 
MEGHAN LOONEY* 
Abstract: On July 14, 2016, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held 
that criminal defendants have a legitimate privacy interest in their booking pho-
tographs, thereby reversing and remanding a grant of summary judgment in favor 
of the Detroit Free Press’s request for the booking photographs of four police of-
ficers who had recently been indicted for bribery and drug conspiracy. In holding 
that the public disclosure of booking photographs may constitute an unwarranted 
invasion of personal privacy, the majority overturned twenty years’ worth of 
Sixth Circuit precedent. The court properly acknowledged that booking photo-
graphs convey a portrait of guilt to the viewer, and that the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act’s exemptions are meant to protect individuals who have not yet been 
convicted from having humiliating personal information freely disclosed to the 
public. This Comment argues in favor of the majority’s holding, which acknowl-
edged that defendants have a privacy interest in their booking photographs and 
adopted a case-by-case approach to balancing that privacy interest against the 
public interest in releasing the photographs. The Sixth Circuit’s decision protects 
the personal identity of the accused in the age of the Internet, and allows defend-
ants to truly maintain their presumption of innocence until proven guilty. 
INTRODUCTION 
On January 25, 2013, the U.S. Marshal Service denied a request by the 
Detroit Free Press for the booking photographs, colloquially referred to as 
“mug shots,” of four police officers awaiting trial in the U.S. District Court for 
the Eastern District of Michigan.1 The four police officers, indicted for bribery 
and drug conspiracy charges, were awaiting a federal trial.2 The Detroit Free 
                                                                                                                           
 * Staff Writer, BOSTON COLLEGE JOURNAL OF LAW & SOCIAL JUSTICE, 2016–2017. 
 1 See Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Detroit Free Press II), 16 F. Supp. 3d 798, 
800–01 (E.D. Mich. 2014), aff’d, 796 F.3d 649 (6th Cir. 2015), rev’d and remanded en banc sub nom. 
Detroit Free Press Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Detroit Free Press IV), 829 F.3d 478 (6th Cir. 2016), 
cert. denied sub nom. Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. Dep’t of Justice, No. 16-706, 2017 WL 2216947 
(U.S. May 22, 2017). 
 2 See Detroit Free Press IV, 829 F.3d at 481. However, while Detroit Free Press II was being 
litigated, all four police officers pled guilty to the charges. See Detroit Free Press II, 16 F. Supp. 3d at 
812. 
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Press, the largest daily newspaper publication in Detroit, Michigan, made the 
request for booking photographs pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act 
(“FOIA”), a statute enacted by Congress in 1966 to promote the disclosure and 
transparency of governmental records to the public.3 FOIA requires that each 
federal agency make their records readily available to the public upon request, 
to enhance the public’s understanding of the federal government’s activities.4 
An agency may only withhold information from the public if the request falls 
within one of nine statutory exemptions to FOIA.5 At issue with the Detroit 
Free Press’ FOIA request in this case is exemption 7(C), which states that 
FOIA does not apply to records created for the purpose of law enforcement that 
“could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal 
privacy.”6 When the U.S. Marshals invoked exemption 7(C) to deny the news-
paper’s request for booking photographs, the Detroit Free Press claimed that this 
denial violated FOIA.7 In response, the Detroit Free Press sued the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice, thereby commencing Detroit Free Press II.8 
In 1996, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit decided Detroit 
Free Press, Inc. v. United States Department of Justice (Detroit Free Press I), a 
case with facts analogous to Detroit Free Press II.9 In Detroit Free Press I, the 
majority held that upon receiving a FOIA request for booking photographs, 
government agencies were required to release the photographs to the requestor 
because defendants could not reasonably expect that this disclosure would im-
plicate their privacy rights.10 The majority in Detroit Free Press I reasoned that 
the Detroit Free Press’ request did not fall within one of FOIA’s exemptions 
because the mere fact that the information was embarrassing or harmful to the 
individual did not necessarily establish an invasion of personal privacy.11 To 
reach this conclusion, the majority held that in an ongoing criminal proceeding 
where the defendant has already appeared in court and had his name made 
public, the dissemination of the defendant’s booking photograph did not vio-
                                                                                                                           
 3 See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2016); Detroit Free Press IV, 829 F.3d at 481; see also U.S. Dep’t of Jus-
tice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 754 (1989) (quoting Dep’t of the Air 
Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 360–61 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 4 See § 552(a); Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. at 775. 
 5 See § 552(b). 
 6 See § 552(b)(7)(C). 
 7 See Detroit Free Press II, 16 F. Supp. 3d at 801. 
 8 See id. 
 9 See Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Detroit Free Press I), 73 F.3d 93, 95 (6th 
Cir. 1996), overruled by Detroit Free Press IV, 829 F.3d at 484. It is important to note that Detroit 
Free Press I is an entirely different case than Detroit Free Press II, even though the two cases have 
similar fact patterns and identical party names. See Detroit Free Press II, 16 F. Supp. 3d at 801. How-
ever, Detroit Free Press II, Detroit Free Press III, and Detroit Free Press IV, all refer to the same 
case and set of facts, and only differ procedurally. See Detroit Free Press IV, 829 F.3d at 481. 
 10 See Detroit Free Press I, 73 F.3d at 97. 
 11 See id. 
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late any privacy rights.12 Adhering to this precedent set forth in Detroit Free 
Press I, in 2014 the District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted 
summary judgment to the Detroit Free Press in Detroit Free Press II, and or-
dered that the U.S. Marshals release the booking photographs of the four po-
lice officers awaiting federal prosecution to the newspaper.13 
On appeal, a panel of the Sixth Circuit heard Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. 
United States Department of Justice (Detroit Free Press III), and, similarly 
constrained by the precedent set forth in Detroit Free Press I, affirmed the dis-
trict court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Detroit Free Press.14 
However, the panel strongly advocated for the full Sixth Circuit to rehear the 
case and reconsider the holding set forth in Detroit Free Press I.15 Upon grant-
ing a rehearing en banc to reevaluate the Sixth Circuit’s precedent, the full 
Sixth Circuit reversed the district court and panel decisions in Detroit Free 
Press IV, holding that defendants in ongoing criminal proceedings have a 
“non-trivial” privacy interest in their booking photos.16 In overturning two 
decades of precedent, and reversing two separate Sixth Circuit decisions, the 
appeals court recognized the damaging and long-lasting effects that the public 
release of booking photographs has on an individual’s privacy interests.17 
Part I of this Comment analyzes the history of the Sixth Circuit precedent 
surrounding the disclosure of booking photographs, beginning with FOIA and 
Detroit Free Press I, followed by the factual and procedural history of Detroit 
Free Press II, III, and IV. Part II of this Comment delves further into the Sixth 
Circuit’s analysis of booking photograph disclosure, and the long-lasting ef-
fects of this practice as compared to the release of other types of documents. 
Part III of this Comment supports the Sixth Circuit majority’s holding in De-
troit Free Press IV that defendants in ongoing criminal proceedings have a sig-
nificant privacy interest in their booking photographs and are thus exempt 
from mandatory disclosure under FOIA. In a society where public information 
is readily accessible and virtually indestructible, the majority properly recog-
nized the irreparable harm that can result from disseminating booking photo-
graphs to the public. 
                                                                                                                           
 12 See id. The court in Detroit Free Press I did not decide whether releasing the booking photo-
graphs following an acquittal, dismissal or conviction would affect a defendant’s privacy interest. Id. 
 13 See Detroit Free Press II, 16 F. Supp. 3d at 801. 
 14 See Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Detroit Free Press III), 796 F.3d 649, 650 
(6th Cir. 2015), rev’d and remanded en banc sub nom. Detroit Free Press Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice 
(Detroit Free Press IV), 829 F.3d 478 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. denied sub nom. Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. 
Dep’t of Justice, No. 16-706, 2017 WL 2216947 (U.S. May 22, 2017). 
 15 See id. 
 16 See Detroit Free Press IV, 829 F.3d at 484. 
 17 See id. at 482. While the majority reversed and remanded the Sixth Circuit precedent and held 
that individuals have a non-trivial privacy interest in their booking photographs, the final vote was 9–
7. See id. at 480. The dissenting author, Judge Danny J. Boggs, wrote a lengthy and heated dissent, 
demonstrating that this case was seriously contested. See id. at 486. 
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I. THE SIXTH CIRCUIT’S JOURNEY TOWARD RECOGNIZING THAT 
DEFENDANTS IN ONGOING CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS HAVE A “NON-
TRIVIAL” PRIVACY INTEREST IN THEIR BOOKING PHOTOGRAPHS 
On January 12, 1996, the Sixth Circuit decided Detroit Free Press I and 
held that the privacy interests of defendants, who have appeared in open court 
and had their names released to the public, are not invaded when their booking 
photographs are released to the public.18 Following this decision, the Sixth 
Circuit upheld Detroit Free Press I precedent for twenty years, and during that 
time was the only circuit court of appeals to hold that a defendant’s privacy is 
not implicated by the release of his or her booking photographs.19 In 2014, the 
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan heard Detroit Free Press II, 
and, following Sixth Circuit precedent, ordered the disclosure of similarly-
requested booking photographs to the newspaper.20 Although a panel of the 
Sixth Circuit subsequently affirmed Detroit Free Press II on August 12, 2015, 
the panel urged the Sixth Circuit to rehear the case en banc.21 Then, on July 14, 
2016, Judge Deborah L. Cook of the Sixth Circuit wrote the majority decision 
in Detroit Free Press IV, which reversed Sixth Circuit precedent and held that 
defendants have a legitimate privacy interest in not having their booking pho-
tographs released to the public.22 
A. FOIA and Detroit Free Press I 
Congress enacted FOIA in 1966 as a part of the Administrative Procedure 
Act (“APA”), in order to put into effect a “general philosophy of full agency 
disclosure” of government records.23 Congress used specific language to foster 
a culture of government transparency.24 Under FOIA, federal government 
                                                                                                                           
 18 See Detroit Free Press I, 73 F.3d 93, 97 (6th Cir. 1996), overruled by Detroit Free Press Inc. v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Detroit Free Press IV), 829 F.3d 478 (6th Cir. 2016) (en banc), cert. denied sub 
nom. Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. Dep’t of Justice, No. 16-706, 2017 WL 2216947 (U.S. May 22, 2017). 
 19 See Detroit Free Press IV, 829 F.3d at 484. 
 20 See Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Detroit Free Press II), 16 F. Supp. 3d 798, 
801 (E.D. Mich. 2014), aff’d, 796 F.3d 649 (6th Cir. 2015), rev’d and remanded en banc sub nom. 
Detroit Free Press IV, 829 F.3d 478, cert. denied sub nom. Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. Dep’t of Justice, 
No. 16-706, 2017 WL 2216947 (U.S. May 22, 2017). 
 21 See Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Detroit Free Press III), 796 F.3d 649, 651 
(6th Cir. 2015), rev’d and remanded en banc sub nom. Detroit Free Press IV, 829 F.3d 478, cert. 
denied sub nom. Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. Dep’t of Justice, No. 16-706, 2017 WL 2216947 (U.S. 
May 22, 2017). 
 22 See Detroit Free Press IV, 829 F.3d at 484. 
 23 See U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 754 
(1989) (quoting Dep’t of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 360–61 (1976)). 
 24 See Rose, 425 U.S. at 360. In response to growing government secrecy in the Cold War, many 
attempts were made by Congress to implement the Freedom of Information Act as a citizen check on 
the government and to maintain government transparency. See Elec. Frontier Found., History of 
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agencies are required to respond to requests that the public makes for agency 
records in order to promote transparency and enable the public to better under-
stand the inner workings of government agencies.25 As a limitation to FOIA’s 
disclosure requirement, however, the statute also contains nine exemptions that 
allow agencies to withhold the requested records for various governmental rea-
sons.26 
In Detroit Free Press I, the U.S. Marshals Service initially rejected the 
Detroit Free Press’ FOIA request for the booking photographs of eight individ-
uals awaiting federal trial, claiming that the request implicated the defendants’ 
privacy interests, pursuant to FOIA exemption 7(C).27 Exemption 7(C) states 
that FOIA does not apply to requests for information or records, compiled for 
law enforcement purposes that, could “reasonably be expected to constitute an 
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”28 Prior to Detroit Free Press I, the 
U.S. Marshals had a policy of only disclosing booking photographs of federal 
defendants if the subject was a fugitive and the release of the photograph 
would assist in his or her capture.29 However, the Sixth Circuit rejected the 
U.S. Marshals’ policy in Detroit Free Press I and held that, because the de-
fendants had already appeared publicly in court, they had no reasonable expec-
tation of privacy to begin with.30 Because the court in Detroit Free Press I 
found that defendants had no reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to 
their booking photographs, it did not need to determine whether such an inva-
sion of privacy would have been unwarranted.31 
                                                                                                                           
FOIA, TRANSPARENCY PROJECT, https://www.eff.org/issues/transparency/history-of-foia [https://
perma.cc/88VR-BNKU]. 
 25 See Rose, 425 U.S. at 360–61. The term “records” is not explicitly defined by FOIA, and is 
only defined within the U.S. Code in the Federal Records Act, as “materials made or received by” an 
agency of the U.S. government. See 44 U.S.C. § 3301(a)(1)(A) (2014). However, the Department of 
Justice website opines that because FOIA was passed to enhance the public’s right to government 
transparency, rather than for managerial reasons, “records” here includes “all tangible recordations of 
information regardless of whether they are records under 44 U.S.C. § 3301.” See FOIA Update: FOIA 
Counselor: What Is an “Agency Record?,” U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Aug. 13, 2014), https://www.
justice.gov/oip/blog/foia-update-foia-counselor-what-agency-record [https://perma.cc/X4K6-DU9K]. 
 26 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2016); Rose, 425 U.S. at 361. 
 27 Detroit Free Press I, 73 F.3d 93, 95 (6th Cir. 1996), overruled by Detroit Free Press IV, 829 
F.3d at 484. 
 28 § 552(b)(7)(C). 
 29 See Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Detroit Free Press II), 16 F. Supp. 3d 798, 
804 (E.D. Mich. 2014), aff’d, 796 F.3d 649 (6th Cir. 2015), rev’d and remanded en banc sub nom. 
Detroit Free Press IV, 829 F.3d 478, cert. denied sub nom. Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. Dep’t of Justice, 
No. 16-706, 2017 WL 2216947 (U.S. May 22, 2017). 
 30 See Detroit Free Press I, 73 F.3d at 97. 
 31 See id. 
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B. Post-Detroit Free Press I: The Evolution of a “Non-Trivial”  
Privacy Interest in Booking Photographs 
In the fifteen years following Detroit Free Press I, the U.S. Marshal Ser-
vice developed a “bifurcated policy” by which it honored the FOIA requests 
for booking photos within the Sixth Circuit, but continued to refuse FOIA re-
quests for booking photographs in all other circuits.32 Throughout this time 
period, the public found ways to thwart the U.S. Marshals’ policy by planting 
“straw man requestors” within the Sixth Circuit to request booking photo-
graphs for media outlets located outside of the four states that comprise the 
Sixth Circuit.33 
While the Department of Justice adhered to its adapted policy, the Sixth 
Circuit litigated the issue of whether the release of booking photographs con-
stitutes an “unwarranted invasion of personal privacy” several times.34 The 
Department of Justice believed that the Sixth Circuit’s “singular view” of pri-
vacy was incorrect and attempted to overturn Detroit Free Press I on multiple 
occasions.35 Finally, in 2011, the Eleventh Circuit decided Karantsalis v. Unit-
ed States Department of Justice, which offered a contrary opinion to the Sixth 
Circuit’s analysis of exemption 7(C).36 Following the Eleventh Circuit’s deci-
sion, in 2012 the Tenth Circuit heard World Publishing Company v. United 
                                                                                                                           
 32 See Detroit Free Press IV, 829 F.3d at 481. 
 33 See id. The Department of Justice generally refused FOIA requests for booking photos, except 
those requests made within the Sixth Circuit. See id. In order to circumvent this practice, media outlets 
from other jurisdictions simply found ways to request the photos from within the Sixth Circuit, like 
filing requests from postal mailboxes located in Michigan, Ohio, Kentucky or Tennessee. See 
Karantsalis v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 635 F.3d 497, 501 n.1 (11th Cir. 2011). As a result of these prac-
tices, journalists were able to secure the booking photos of celebrities such as Bernie Madoff. See 
Detroit Free Press IV, 829 F.3d at 481. 
 34 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (2016); Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 4 n.7, Detroit Free Press III, 
796 F.3d 650 (6th Cir. 2015) (No. 14-1670). 
 35 See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 34, at 4 n.7. In two back-to-back cases in 2005, the 
Department of Justice attempted to defy Sixth Circuit precedent. See id. In Beacon Journal Publ’g Co. 
v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, the Northern District of Ohio Eastern Division denied the Department of 
Justice’s motion to dismiss after the Department of Justice recognized it was bound by Circuit prece-
dent to release booking photographs, pursuant to Beacon Journal Publishing Co.’s request. See Bea-
con Journal Publ’g Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 5:05-cv-1396-DDD (N.D. Ohio Aug. 30, 2005). 
In Detroit Free Press v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, the Eastern District of Michigan Southern Division 
granted summary judgment in favor of the Department of Justice, but granted attorney’s fees and costs 
to Detroit Free Press. Detroit Free Press v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 2:05-71601-ADT-SDP (E.D. 
Mich. Oct. 7, 2005). 
 36 See Karantsalis, 635 F.3d at 503. In this case, a freelance reporter submitted a FOIA request to 
the Department of Justice for the booking photograph of Luis Giro, the former president of Giro In-
vestments Group, who had previously pled guilty to securities fraud. See id. at 499. In determining 
that the release of his booking photograph would implicate Giro’s personal privacy, the Eleventh 
Circuit acknowledged that booking photographs “carry a clear implication of criminal activity,” and 
that they are distinct from normal photos and thus raise unique privacy interests for defendants. See id. 
at 503 (internal citation omitted). 
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States Department of Justice, and similarly expressly disagreed with Detroit 
Free Press I, holding that “when the public interest is balanced against the pri-
vacy interest in a booking photo,” a request for the photograph did not “further 
the purpose of FOIA.”37 
In response to this circuit court split, the U.S. Marshals Service stopped 
implementing its “bifurcated policy” and returned to its original practice of 
refusing to grant FOIA requests for the booking photographs of defendants on 
trial.38 The Department of Justice also issued a “Booking Photo Disclosure 
Policy” on December 12, 2012, in response to the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits’ 
decisions supporting the non-release of booking photographs.39 Gerald M. Au-
erbach, the general counsel of the U.S. Marshals Service, further explained 
that, as a general rule, the release of booking photographs to the media does 
not serve law enforcement purposes.40 As a result of this new policy, the U.S. 
Marshals Service essentially disregarded Sixth Circuit precedent and stated 
that it would not disclose booking photographs to the public unless it deter-
mined that the requestor “ha[d] made a requisite showing that the public inter-
est . . . outweighs the privacy interest at stake . . . .”41 Thus, the Department of 
Justice disagreed with the Sixth Circuit, and found an opportunity to re-litigate 
this issue in Detroit Free Press II, when the Detroit Free Press once again 
made a FOIA request for the booking photographs of recently indicted police 
officers.42 
In Detroit Free Press II, the District Court for the Eastern District of 
Michigan granted summary judgment in favor of the Detroit Free Press for the 
violation of FOIA.43 The court acknowledged that stare decisis applied, since 
the Sixth Circuit had previously ruled in favor of the Detroit Free Press on the 
                                                                                                                           
 37 See World Pub. Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 672 F.3d 825, 829 (10th Cir. 2012). The World 
Publishing Company submitted a FOIA request to the Department of Justice for the booking photos of 
six pretrial detainees. See id. The Tenth Circuit compared the incriminating information contained 
within rap sheets to the “vivid and personal portrayal of a person’s likeness in a booking photograph,” 
concluding that booking photos similarly fall within FOIA exemption 7(C). See id. 
 38 See Detroit Free Press IV, 829 F.3d at 481. 
 39 See Memorandum from Gerald Auerbach, Gen. Counsel of the U.S. Marshals Serv. to All U.S. 
Marshals, et al. (Dec. 12, 2012) (on file with the U.S. Marshals Service) https://www.usmarshals.gov/
foia/policy/booking_photos.pdf [https://perma.cc/66DM-XZJ5]. The disclosure policy stated: “in light 
of the weight of legal precedent now supporting the Department of Justice’s conclusion that booking 
photographs generally should not be disclosed under the FOIA, the Department has decided a uniform 
policy should be applied.” Id. 
 40 See id. 
 41 See id. 
 42 See id.; Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Detroit Free Press II), 16 F. Supp. 3d 
798, 801 (E.D. Mich. 2014), aff’d, 796 F.3d 649 (6th Cir. 2015), rev’d and remanded en banc sub 
nom. Detroit Free Press IV, 829 F.3d 478, cert. denied sub nom. Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. Dep’t of 
Justice, No. 16-706, 2017 WL 2216947 (U.S. May 22, 2017). 
 43 See Detroit Free Press II, 16 F. Supp. 3d at 801. 
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same issue in Detroit Free Press I, which was controlling precedent.44 Howev-
er, the District Court held that the Department of Justice was not precluded 
from seeking en banc review of this issue in the Sixth Circuit, and found sev-
eral of the Department of Justice’s arguments to be persuasive.45 The district 
court ultimately ruled that the Department of Justice must release the requested 
booking photographs to the Detroit Free Press, but it granted a request to stay 
the order pending appeal.46 On appeal, a Sixth Circuit panel affirmed the dis-
trict court’s decision and granted summary judgment to the newspaper.47 Alt-
hough the Sixth Circuit panel was similarly bound by its own precedent from 
Detroit Free Press I, the panel expressed serious disfavor toward the holding 
and maintained in dicta that defendants do have a privacy interest in their 
booking photographs.48 
After considering the panel decision, the Sixth Circuit reheard the case en 
banc and reversed and remanded the grant of summary judgment, holding that 
booking photos are exemptible under 7(C) of FOIA.49 Thus, the majority in 
Detroit Free Press IV adopted a case-by-case approach to balance individual 
privacy interests with the public interests FOIA was enacted to protect.50 
II. THE SIXTH CIRCUIT’S SHIFT TOWARD UNDERSTANDING THE LONG-
TERM IMPACT OF RELEASING BOOKING PHOTOGRAPHS TO THE PUBLIC 
In Detroit Free Press IV, the Sixth Circuit held that the public release of 
booking photographs “could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwar-
ranted invasion of personal privacy.”51 Judge Cook of the Sixth Circuit, writing 
                                                                                                                           
 44 See id. at 807. 
 45 See id. at 808. For example, the court found the Department of Justice’s argument that because 
of FOIA’s liberal venue provision, it is possible that continuing to follow Sixth Circuit precedent 
could directly conflict with the contrary precedent in the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, to be persua-
sive. See id. 
 46 See id. at 813. 
 47 See Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Detroit Free Press III), 796 F.3d 649, 651 
(6th Cir. 2015), rev’d and remanded en banc sub nom. Detroit Free Press IV, 829 F.3d 478, cert. 
denied sub nom. Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. Dep’t of Justice, No. 16-706, 2017 WL 2216947 (U.S. 
May 22, 2017). 
 48 See id. The Sixth Circuit panel acknowledged that it was bound by Sixth Circuit precedent, but 
it questioned the conclusion that defendants have no privacy interest in keeping their booking photo-
graphs from being released to the public throughout the criminal proceedings. See id. The panel also 
quoted from Judge Alan Norris’ heated dissent in Detroit Free Press I, “maintaining that a booking 
photograph conveys ‘much more than the appearance of the pictured individual . . . .’” See id. at 651 
(Norris, J., dissenting) (quoting Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Detroit Free Press I), 
73 F.3d 93, 95 (6th Cir. 1996), overruled by Detroit Free Press IV, 829 F.3d 484). 
 49 See Detroit Free Press IV, 829 F.3d at 484. 
 50 Id. at 485. 
 51 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (2016); Detroit Free Press Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Detroit Free 
Press IV), 829 F.3d 478 (6th Cir. 2016) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. 
Dep’t of Justice, No. 16-706, 2017 WL 2216947 (U.S. May 22, 2017). 
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for the majority, found that Detroit Free Press I expressed an “impermissibly 
cramped notion of personal privacy that is out of step with the broad privacy 
interests recognized by our sister circuits.”52 After analyzing the requirements 
of FOIA exemption 7(C), the majority concluded that the public release of 
booking photographs could reasonably be found to violate a defendant’s priva-
cy interests, and therefore held that this practice fell within the exemption.53 
The majority in Detroit Free Press IV determined that Detroit Free Press 
I had defined privacy far too narrowly.54 To evaluate whether the release of a 
booking photograph falls within FOIA exemption 7(C), the majority analyzed 
7(C)’s requirements individually, much like Judge Martha Craig Daughtrey did 
in Detroit Free Press I.55 The three-step checklist for coverage within FOIA 
exemption 7(C) requires that: 1) the records be “compiled for law enforcement 
purposes,” 2) the “release of the information by the federal agency must rea-
sonably be expected to constitute an invasion of personal privacy,” and 3) the 
“intrusion into private matters must be deemed unwarranted.”56 Since there 
was no dispute in Detroit Free Press IV that booking photographs are “com-
piled for law enforcement purposes,” the majority next considered whether the 
release of the photographs could reasonably be expected to constitute a viola-
tion of the defendants’ privacy.57 The government bore the burden to show that 
FOIA exemption 7(C) shielded the defendants from the release of their book-
ing photographs.58 
To evaluate the privacy issue, the court looked first to the very nature of 
booking photographs.59 Booking photographs are taken at arguably the most 
vulnerable moment of a person’s life—immediately after they are “accused, 
taken into custody, and deprived of most liberties.”60 The Supreme Court of the 
United States has held that FOIA exemption 7(C) is meant to protect citizens 
against the public disclosure of personal matters and to help maintain control 
over information pertaining to their own person.61 The Sixth Circuit reasoned 
                                                                                                                           
 52 Detroit Free Press IV, 829 F.3d at 484. 
 53 See id. 
 54 See id. 
 55 See id. at 481; Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Detroit Free Press I), 73 F.3d 
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that because booking photographs convey a portrait of guilt to viewers, regard-
less of the outcome of the case, releasing these photographs constitutes an in-
vasion of privacy against which exemption 7(C) is meant to protect.62 The 
Sixth Circuit also recognized that, in the age of the Internet, releasing a book-
ing photograph to a newspaper like the Detroit Free Press renders the photo-
graph readily accessible around the world on the Internet, where it can remain 
indefinitely.63 Although individuals are sometimes able to pay a website to re-
move a booking photograph, the majority noted that the complicated steps in-
dividuals take to have the photographs removed further reinforces that they 
have a non-trivial privacy interest in the photographs.64 
After establishing that defendants have a non-trivial privacy interest in 
their booking photographs, the court then evaluated whether the privacy viola-
tion was unwarranted such that the disclosure would fall within exemption 
7(C).65 To make this determination, the majority in Detroit Free Press IV 
adopted the Department of Justice’s proposed case-by-case approach for 
weighing the public’s interest in disclosing booking photographs with the pri-
vacy interests implicated by this practice.66 The court rejected the Detroit Free 
Press’ proposed categorical approach, whereby privacy interests are always 
outweighed by the public interest in releasing the booking photographs to the 
public.67 The court held that the public’s interest in disclosing booking photo-
graphs pursuant to FOIA would depend on whether the disclosure would ad-
vance the “core purpose” of FOIA.68 Because FOIA was enacted for the core 
purpose of enhancing the public’s understanding of government activities and 
operations, the public interest in disclosing the booking photographs would 
only outweigh the private interests of the defendant if the photographs shed 
light on the inner-workings of the Department of Justice as an agency.69 Thus, 
the Sixth Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment and remanded the 
case to the district court to decide whether the facts of this case would warrant 
the release of the booking photographs under FOIA.70 
Chief Judge Ransey Cole of the Sixth Circuit penned a concurrence in 
Detroit Free Press IV, emphasizing the important role that technology played 
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in overruling Detroit Free Press I, and reiterating that the holding of Detroit 
Free Press IV does not foreclose the possibility that significant public interests 
could outweigh the privacy interests of defendants.71 Chief Judge Cole de-
scribed the drastic shift in technology in the last twenty years, and explained 
that because of the shift in the prominence of the Internet, the holding of De-
troit Free Press I no longer comports with justice.72 Thus, although Detroit 
Free Press I stood on solid ground in 1996, he agreed with the majority that it 
was no longer workable.73 Chief Judge Cole also provided several examples of 
significant public interests that could outweigh the privacy interest in booking 
photographs, such as allowing public oversight of law enforcement conduct or 
uncovering government misconduct in investigations.74 He concluded that both 
public disclosure and personal privacy are equally important, and thus they 
must be weighed on a case-by-case basis.75 
Judge Danny Julian Boggs dissented in Detroit Free Press IV, arguing 
that the majority’s reversal of the decades-old precedent set forth in Detroit 
Free Press I was justified only by a “vague privacy interest in inherently non-
private matters.”76 The dissent used the same three-part analysis of FOIA ex-
emption 7(C) as the majority, and agreed with the majority that booking pho-
tographs are compiled for law enforcement purposes.77 Thus, Judge Boggs an-
alyzed the remaining two questions – whether booking photographs contain 
private information pursuant to exemption 7(C), and, if so, whether disclosing 
such photographs would be an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.78 
With respect to the privacy interest, the dissent outlined a history of disclo-
sure of booking photographs, as well as common law and state law practices in 
favor of disclosing booking photographs to the public, and concluded that after a 
defendant has appeared in open court, he has no cognizable privacy interest in 
his booking photograph.79 Further, the dissent favored a categorical approach 
that would always favor the public interests in disclosure over the defendant’s 
privacy interest, reasoning that this procedure would help prevent mistaken 
identification and reduce racial profiling.80 However, the majority stated that 
these reasons were “phantoms,” because defendants can simply waive their 
privacy interest if they were concerned about mistaken identification.81 The 
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majority also correctly recognized that while there may be a strong public in-
terest in disclosing booking photographs, this does not preclude the possibility 
of an equally strong individual interest in keeping the photograph private.82 
III. THE IMPACT OF THE MAJORITY’S HOLDING ON PROTECTING THE 
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE AND PREVENTING THE DISSEMINATION  
OF BOOKING PHOTOGRAPHS ACROSS THE NATION 
The majority’s opinion in Detroit Free Press IV is a monumental step to-
ward protecting the personal privacy rights of all U.S. citizens.83 One of the 
most cherished tenants of the U.S. judicial system is the notion that defendants 
are innocent until proven guilty, and in Detroit Free Press IV, the Sixth Circuit 
acknowledged that releasing booking photographs to the public “effectively 
eliminates the presumption of innocence and replac[es] it with an unmistakable 
badge of criminality.”84 When booking photographs are freely released to the 
media and posted on the internet, the person in the photograph is no longer 
innocent in the eyes of the public.85 In American society, booking photographs 
are unique and vivid symbols of criminality and guilt.86 These humiliating 
photographs are taken just after a person has been accused of a crime, deprived 
of personal liberties, and is awaiting the consequences of his or her arrest.87 
For these reasons, it is detrimental for a defendant awaiting trial to have his 
photograph available on the Internet indefinitely.88 
The majority in Detroit Free Press IV properly reasoned that releasing a 
defendant’s booking photograph to the public has a substantially more pro-
found impact on a defendant now than it did in 1996, when the Sixth Circuit 
decided Detroit Free Press I.89 The court found that in 1996, the release of a 
booking photograph could undoubtedly tarnish a defendant’s reputation in the 
short-term, by displaying his or her face on local television or newspapers, but 
that it would eventually disappear into the archives.90 Nowadays, many web-
sites exist that regularly post booking photographs online in order to exploit 
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defendants, charging significant fees to remove the photos from the webpage.91 
As a result, the majority appropriately recognized that publicly releasing a 
booking photograph could cast a permanent shadow on a defendant’s future, 
even if he or she is never convicted of the crime charged.92 
Just as the Supreme Court held that the public disclosure of criminal iden-
tification records, or “rap sheets,” violates a defendant’s personal privacy in-
terests, it would hold that FOIA exemption 7(C) would apply to booking pho-
tographs.93 While criminal identification records merely provide basic personal 
information about a defendant such as their criminal history or height and 
weight, booking photographs are even more revealing because they display the 
unforgettable image of the defendant’s face to the world.94 Further, a booking 
photograph is not protected by the mundane, formulaic order of a rap sheet, 
which is completely disassociated with the image of the defendant.95 Instead, 
booking photographs typically portray the face of an unkempt defendant with a 
grimace and a sign bearing a criminal identification number.96 This image is a 
nationally recognized symbol of guilt, and it unfairly portrays the accused in a 
moment of weakness.97 Thus, just as the Supreme Court has held that publicly 
disclosing criminal identification records violates defendants’ personal privacy 
interests, it logically follows that FOIA exemption 7(C) applies to the public 
disclosure of booking photographs, since they are even more intimate and 
more private.98 
The outcome of Detroit Free Press IV also has a profound impact on the 
criminal justice system, particularly because non-white individuals are 
overrepresented among those arrested.99 As of 2006, African American indi-
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viduals were 2.5 times more likely to be arrested than white individuals.100 
Further, the widest disparities across race were found in drug crimes, and vio-
lent crimes such as murder, non-negligent manslaughter and robbery.101 When 
booking photographs could be disseminated in the Sixth Circuit pursuant to 
FOIA, these minority groups were not only stigmatized by law enforcement, 
but they were also further disadvantaged in society because their reputation 
could be tarnished, further perpetuating cycle of systematic injustice.102 Thus, 
as a result of Detroit Free Press IV, statistically disadvantaged individuals in 
the criminal justice system directly benefit from having their privacy interests 
protected, and need not worry that their booking photographs will be dissemi-
nated to the public without careful judicial oversight.103 
The Sixth Circuit’s decision has an impact that goes beyond its borders of 
Ohio, Michigan, Kentucky and Tennessee.104 Although the Sixth Circuit was the 
only circuit in which the U.S. Marshals honored FOIA requests for booking pho-
tographs, essentially every media outlet had access to these documents.105 In the 
U.S. Department of Justice’s Opening Brief in Detroit Free Press III, the gov-
ernment explained that national media entities frequently exploited the Sixth 
Circuit “exception,” and essentially “created a nationwide loophole” through 
which requestors could access booking photographs from any state.106 Thus, by 
overturning long-standing Sixth Circuit precedent, the court in Free Press IV 
effectively protected the privacy interests of an entire class of Americans.107 
After Detroit Free Press IV, citizens arrested on federal charges can rest 
assured that the government will not immediately disseminate their booking 
photographs pursuant to a FOIA request, but rather will evaluate on a case-by-
case basis the public’s interest in disclosing the photographs.108 The majority in 
Detroit Free Press IV properly recognized that, in addition to stigmatizing and 
                                                                                                                           
casians, and, as of 2001, one out of six black men are incarcerated. See NAACP, Criminal Justice 
Fact Sheet, NAACP.ORG, http://www.naacp.org/pages/criminal-justice-fact-sheet [https://perma.cc/
D8LB-22CS]. Allowing the media to request and publish booking photographs exacerbates an already 
broken criminal justice system, and exposes minority populations to more suspicion and racial bias in 
the future, as a result of their publicly available booking photographs. See id. 
 100 See HARNEY & VUONG, supra note 99. 
 101 See id. 
 102 See id.; Detroit Free Press Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Detroit Free Press IV), 829 F.3d 478 
(6th Cir. 2016) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. Dep’t of Justice, No. 16-
706, 2017 WL 2216947 (U.S. May 22, 2017). 
 103 See Free Press IV, 829 F.3d at 482. 
 104 See Karantsalis v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 635 F.3d 497, 503 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 105 See Free Press IV, 829 F.3d at 481. 
 106 See Brief of Defendant-Appellant at *14–*15, Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice 
(Detroit Free Press III), 796 F.3d 649 (6th Cir. 2015) (No. 14-1670), rev’d and remanded en banc sub 
nom. Detroit Free Press IV, 829 F.3d 478, cert. denied sub nom. Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. Dep’t of 
Justice, No. 16-706, 2017 WL 2216947 (U.S. May 22, 2017). 
 107 See id. 
 108 See Free Press IV, 829 F.3d at 484–85. 
2017] Detroit Free Press and a Non-Trivial Privacy Interest in Booking Photographs 59 
humiliating a defendant, the release of a booking photograph might also ham-
per an individual’s “professional and personal prospects.”109 Thus, by revers-
ing Detroit Free Press I and ensuring that the public can only obtain booking 
photographs upon a showing that the public interests outweigh the private in-
terests, the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Detroit Free Press IV adequately pro-
tects the reputation and dignity of future generations of individuals arrested on 
federal charges in the United States.110 By closing off the Sixth Circuit loop-
hole for media outlets to obtain booking photographs, the court has also pro-
tected defendants across the country from being automatically deprived of 
their innocence, long before they are ever found guilty.111 
CONCLUSION 
The Constitution promises Americans that the government will protect 
certain inalienable rights, such as the presumption of innocence until proven 
guilty. In Detroit Free Press IV, the Sixth Circuit decided that defendants have 
a non-trivial privacy interest in their booking photographs, and thus that this 
category of government records can be exempted from FOIA, pursuant to ex-
emption 7(C), if the privacy interests of the defendant outweigh the public’s 
interest. Instead of ordering the systematic release of these deeply personal 
photographs, which arguably portray the most shameful moment of a person’s 
life, the majority agreed with the Department of Justice that this practice con-
stitutes an invasion of personal privacy, and adopted a case-by-case approach. 
The majority also refuted the dissent’s misaligned position that because de-
fendants have already appeared publicly in court, they no longer have a rea-
sonable privacy interest in their booking photograph. After Detroit Free Press 
IV, in order to justify releasing the booking photograph of a defendant awaiting 
federal prosecution to the public, the requestor must have a reason for the re-
quest that aligns with the purpose of FOIA, which is to better the public’s un-
derstanding of government activities. 
Prior to Detroit Free Press IV, even though the Sixth Circuit was the only 
circuit to allow FOIA requests for booking photographs, it was easy for entities 
in other states to make requests through loopholes in the U.S. Marshals’ sys-
tem. Thus, by reversing Free Press I, the Sixth Circuit was able to truly end the 
media’s practice of obtaining booking photographs for the first time. Further, 
the court’s decision protects minority groups, who are already overrepresented 
in the criminal justice system, from having their privacy interests violated and 
reputations tarnished by the public release of booking photographs for crimes 
they may not have even committed. In today’s world, running a preliminary 
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Google search of someone’s name is commonplace for job interviews, school 
admissions, and even online dating. By rightfully reversing Detroit Free Press I, 
the majority ensured that the media cannot mercilessly subject a defendant to a 
lifetime of humiliation without first showing that the public’s interest in releas-
ing the booking photograph outweighs this blatant invasion of personal privacy. 
